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prejudices. This is where I believe that taking political culture seriously
is indisPensable.
Myth is defined for the purposes of my analysis as a widely shared
,traditional story of ostensib-ly historical events that serves to unfold
part of the world view of a people or explain a practice, belief'.
A 'popular belief or tradition [...] especially: one embodying the ideals
and institutions of a society or segment of society'. This is Barthe's
definition in his seminal book Mythologies that significantly provides
as an example of the importance of myths in late modernity a cover
of Parls-Match with a young black soldier saluting the French flag.
He interprets this as an affirmation of the myth of France as a 'great
empire' in which 'all' 'without colour discrimination' 'served her
Íaithfully'.2 The importance of myths of empire has also been explored
in the field of international relations bút with a focus on imperial
expansion.3 Surely it is equally worth explodng the myths of the end
of empire, the myths of decolonization.
There has been some reference to potential myths of decolonization
in key works on British or Portuguese decolonization. For instance, John
Darwin made a strong case against romantic delusions of a well-planned
British decolonizatlon. The imperial legacy was artfully repackaged as
the great work of nation building, but this could not disguise the grow-
ing fragility of British global power leading to frequent crises and unex-
pected accelerations of decolonization.4 Norrie Macqueen has argued
that the notion of the Portuguese coup of April 1974 organized by the
Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas, MFA) as a
fourth liberation movement aimed at decolonization was a convenient
façade covering the loss of colonies by the military by turning them
into liberators overseas as well as at home.s
But while these mythical narratives may not be good guides for obiec-
tive analysis, they are important social constructions with real impact,
and require careful study. A book that illustrates the importance of this
process of cultural construction is the pioneering work on the French
'invention of decolonization' by Todd Shepard; another is a recent col-
lective volume on the 'French colonial mind'.6
The last Portuguese (overseas) territories co-ordination minister argues
that it took more than a decade of wars in Africa for 'the greater powet
of realities over convictions' regarding overseas Portuguese territories to
prevail, leading to decolonization.T This is surely a powerful indication
that it is both wrong to ignore the real, potentially even deadly, power
of political culture, and to argue its influence has no limlts.
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This chapter considers the construction of the notion of decolonization
in the context of national political cultures. It seeks to explore the ques-
tion: What was the role of cultural prejudices and preferences in the
end of the three biggest European colonial empires in Africa? Answers
will be provided by tracing the impact of some explicit and recurrent
cultural prejudices at the level of senior decision makers and officials in
comparing British, French, and Portuguese decolonization.
It is not possible to show unequivocally here the decisive role of
political culture in decolonization. My aim is simply to present argu-
ments and evidence from some relevant sources that it did play an
important role in both setting the pace and helping define the shape of
decolonization.
Why decolonization myths matter
Decolonization is understood in this text as primarily the formal end of
colonial empires through 'the surrender of political sovereignty over the
peoples of Africa and Asia and the emergence of independent nation-
states'.l The end of formal empires as proud political and cultural con-
structs is one of the cornerstones of contemporary international politics
resulting in around 200 states recognized by the United Nations (UN).
Yet there was no complete military collapse of these colonial powers
comparable to other cases of imperial demise (Ancient Rome, Tsarist
Russia). The Second World War seriously weakened Western colonial
empires in some parts of Asia, but this was not true in sub-Saharan
Africa. Colonial powers in Africa still had some choice, some ability
to resist and shape decolonization according to core preferences and
r26
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Approach and research questions
D. K. Fieldhouse is right in pointing out that 'the history of imperialism is
distinct from that of particular imperial possessions'.8 Even if we were to
concur with Ronald Robinson that 'British and French imperialism are as
different as chalk from cheese', we would still need comparative studies to
better understand how and why.e The addition of a third case 
- 
Portugal 
-
offers the added value of making it more difficult to algue in terms of
simplistic dichotomies. These are also the three largest colonial empires
in Africa, even if Portugal is often quickly dismissed as a marginal odd-
ity. And while the comparative analysis of the history of decolonization
has been present for some time, it is still indispensable to fully compre-
hend such an international phenomenon as decolonization.lo
The second main element of my analytical approach is a focus on
culture, in particular political and strategic culture. But is this not too
fuzzy and undetermined to be of use in rigorous analysis? This has been
debated in depth in the field of international relations, with advocates
of a culturalist approach to international politics arguing convincingly
that norms condition what is deemed acceptable in a given commu-
nitylorganization and often have a demonstrable impact in terms of
perceptions, discourse, and behaviour.ll The so-called constructivist
school has emerged around the importance of culture understood as
norms/ that is collective expectations about proper behaviour for a
given identity. Even if it accepts that 'the presence of norms does not
dictate compliance. Any new or emergent norm must compete with
existing, perhaps countervailing, orì€s'.12 The notions of Greater France
or Portugal are prime examples of a social definition of identity seri
ously constraining what is deemed do-able and acceptable in terms of
political culture. The triumph of the new international norm of decolo-
nization therefore required the difficult task of reconsüucting national
identity.
The key questions derived from this approach are: In what way have
cultural preferences affected decisions on decolonization? Was this seen
as a menace to the basic identity, the constitutional norms of a certain
polity? How was this overcome or accommodated?
Britain: from liberal colonial power to centre
of the Commonwealth?
Pragmatism is often emphasized as the cornerstone of Britain's approach
to decolonization. Based on a massive collection of documentation,
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Ronald Hyam concludes that from the Second World War on, 'prag-
matic tactics operated over a broad spectrum of colonial problems'.
John Darwin argues that 'British governments, or certainly their advi-
sors in the Foreign Office, prided themselves on their pragmatism,.l3
This might seem as incompatlble with the importance of cultural fac-
tors. In fact we see this proud pragmatism as an affirmation of a strong
cultural preference. Furthermore, even if taken at face value and as
an unproblematic affirmation of a preference for a more lnstrumen-
tal approach to reality, it does not automatically guarantee success in
achieving an unbiased, coldly realistic vision of the actors and actions
about which to be pragmatic. For instance, it does not guarantee an
unprejudiced attitude towards colonized peoples, their elites and their
ability for self-rule. Nor does it automatically dictate any less of a wish
for (pragmatically) insisting on as much (pragmatic) metropolitan
imperial control throughout the process as possible. It did not pre-
clude British elites from showing some political blindness in an initial
absolute refusal of decolonization, because of the alleged (pragmatic)
strategic necessity for bases in the Suez, Cyprus, Aden or even Kenya
and Rhodesia with its white settlers.14 Pragmatism is, in other words,
less linear than it might seem, but it was certainly a strong preference
in British political culture and one that did have some impact.
The most obvious evidence of this Brttish pragmatism came with
the official reviews of costs and benefits of overseas territories. These
reflected an attitude after the Second World War of cutting adrift from
dependencies that were net losers, like Burma and Palestine, while
keeping those 'possessions which remained bankable assets'.ls Malaya
was the paradigmatic example of a dollar-earner exporter of commodi-
ties essential for the sterling area that should 
- 
pragmatically 
- 
be kept
under colonial control as long as possible and carefully entrusted to
friendly elites.
The most cited 
- 
and one of the most systematic 
- 
of these reviews
was ordered by Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in Ig57. Perhaps less
obviously important for decolonization, but arguably even more deci-
sive, were the strategic defence reviews under Conservative defence sec-
retary Duncan Sandys, also in 1957, and Labour defence secretary Denis
Healey in 1965. The interesting point is that these wider reviews of colo-
nial costs and benefits were relatively inconclusive 
- 
another illustra-
tion that pragmatism does not necessarily provide unequivocal answers
for complex political questions. But the defence reviews were very con-
clusive regarding the colonial policy implications of deep defence cuts.
The defence White Paper of 1957 states:'It is [...] in the true interest of
-Y-
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defence that the claims of military expenditure should be considered
in coniunction with the need to maintain the country's financial and
economic strength'.16 One key implication of these defence reviews was
that there should be no major overseas counter-insurgency campaigns
in the future.17 The decisions to get out even more quickly of central
and eastern Africa, after the Nyasaland Emergency of 1959, or not to
engage more in the campaign in South Arabia (Aden) and eventually to
withdraw from all BrÌtish bases east of the Suez were the logical conclu-
sion of this. As Healey made clear when discussing the implications of
the 1965 defence cuts: 'there were two military tasks that we could not
undertake in the future', one of those being'large-scale long-term coun-
terinsurgency operations'.l8 The British approach to decolonization
therefore changed from being (in the late-1940s and early-1.950s) one
of pragmatically balancing between places to stay and fight and places
to leave, to one (frorn the end of the 1950s) in which the need to avoid
any more conflicts to stop or slow decolonization became increasingly
paralnount.
Two further points should be underlined. The first is that even if not
always offering an obvious answer/ this pragmatic attitude was not seen
as anti-patriotic anathema as was the case for a long time in discussions
of French and Portuguese decolonization. The reactions to the argu-
ments of the leading French public intellectual Raymond Aron are para-
digmatic, with him being widely attacked, including by senior political
figures, for selling the national honour and ignoring the moral duty of
France when he argued precisely for a policy review of French engage-
ment in Algeria and Africa in light of 'economic pragmatism'.le
The second is that pragmatism does not eliminate culture. Not only
can it be seen as in itself an expression of a cultural preference, but it
cannot work independently from perceptions of reality that are often
biased by cultural prejudices. This is best illustrated by the fact that
this British pragmatisrn was comforted by what proved to be a largely
illusory myth of decolonization; that pro-British, or at least pragmatic,
moderate forces would prevail in former colonies, and that as independ-
ent countries they would consequently continue to turn to Britain for
experienced guidance.20
The central importance in British decolonization policy of a Whig
narrative of deliberate gradual development of the dependent territo-
ries into self-governing dominions and then independent members of
the Commonwealth is clear from the start. Creech Jones - the colonial
secetary in the post-1945 Labour Government that initiated the pro-
cess of decolonization 
- 
stated unequivocally in a widely distributed
i
'
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report that 'the central purpose of British colonial policy is simple. It is
to guide the colonial territories to responsible self'government within
the Commonwealth'. This vision may well be criticized.as self-serving,
paternalistic; representative of a grand plan that was never really imple-
mented. Though to be fair, in the same document it is pragmatically
recognized that 'though the policy is clear enough, the problerns to be
overcome in carrying it out are numerous and complex'.21 Yet regard-
less of these problems, the central British myth of decolonization was
still relevant.
A 1946 guideline for propaganda signed by Herbert Morrison for the
Central Office of Information and the British Council global network
stated that 'Britain is the centre of a world-wide association of free
peoples', the British Commonwealth makes it a 'world power'with the
credibility and the will to approach the various 'problems presented
by the adrninistration of backward tropical territories which comprised
the greater part of the colonial empire' in terms that were 'both liberal
and dynamic'.zz Naturally, in a significant sign of the importance of
historical change in cultural sensibility, today the notion of backward
tropical territories would not be seen as liberal or pragmatic, but rather
as strongly preiudiced. This gives evidence of a crucial point I wish to
underline here: even during decolonization, and because of cultural
prejudices shaping it, there was no notion of real as opposed to formal
equality between colonizers and colonized.
The myth of British decolonization presents an ideal image of the
Iatter as: first, the continuation of the glorious history of gradual con-
stitutional development of the British peoples; second, the affirmation
of the liberal character of British colonialism, the appropriate kind for
a political community that identified deeply with liberalism as well as
with pragmatism; third, not a rebuttal but a culmination of the civiliz-
ing mission of the British among primitive natives; and fourth, not
undermining but enhancing its global great power status. This may not
be very helpful as a guide to the concrete difficulties of setting actual
policy in all its details, but it is certainly very revealing about the kind of
mainstream cultural preferences according to which senior British offi-
cials and decision makers perceived and tried to shape decolonization.
The fact that two major aspects of British identity could be used to
facilitate the acceptance of decolonization's appropriateness certainly
made it easier', One was its linkage with a long liberal heritage. The other
was the composite nature of the British polity uniting in shared alle-
giance to the Crown varied and varying institutional entities, starting
with the United Kingdom itself and extending to the dominions. David
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Cannadine's approach to empire as a historical construct closely linked
to British national identity is particularly fruitful, especially his insight
into the impact of decolonization as happening not iust overseas but
also in Britain. This chapter hopes to contribute to the effort to grapple
with that process of reconstruction of the British identity during decolo-
nization by comparing it with other cases.23
The acceptance of decolonization was also made easier by a great degree
of cultural commonality between the UK and the US 
- 
enthusiastically
'discovered'by British elites after 1945. This tended to make British elites
slightly more comfortable with a pressure for decolonization coming from
the US. The reverse was true in the case of France and Portugal, which had
very strong reservations about a process seen as the result of self-serving
Anglo-Saxon powers sticking together bound by a common cultute.za
France: from republican empire to francophoníe?
There is a strong preference in mainstream French culture for rationality
understood in terms of a uniformity of approach commonly referred to
as Cartesianism. This has visible effects from the orthogonal landscape
design of public parks to the way diplomatic negotiations are conducted
with what is often perceived by others as rigidness and arrogance.zs De
Gaulle, the dominant political figure in French politics during the most
crucial stage of decolonization, is often perceived abroad as an example
of this. Yet he was himself aware of this as a potential problem, at least
in others, complaining about the French mind 'age-old allurements of
the a priori, the absolute and the dogmatic'.26
Girardet in his seminal study of French colonial ideology describes
well the impact of this trend in the 'ever present centralizing and
unitary mentality' that made any significant devolution within the so-
called French Union, created after L946, very difficult to accept in prin-
ciple and implement in practice.zT This French determination to impose
a similar Cartesian approach to its relations to its overseas territories did
not exclude change. But it did shape a particular kind of change; for
instance, the response to the new challenge posed by the independence
of Guinea Conakry in 1958. Change should logically be led by Paris,
should ensure by a formal treaty and informal networks a strong linkage
with and publicly expressed gratitude to France, and result in a similar
status for all large French territories in continental Africa.
But how could the French be so rational and apparently 
- 
with hind-
sight and taking decolonization as a given 
- 
pursue such an irrational
policy? Arguably, this was the case especially of French Algeria, formally
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a (special) part of the metropole itself. This made any attempt at rational
cost/benefit analysis very difficult to accept as appropriate. The repeated
violent reactions - from military pronunciømentos to' assassination
attempts - against decolonization of Algeria, targeting first the Fourth
Republic and then President de Gaulle, throughout the late 1950s and
early 1960s, prove the real importance of this kind of cultural taboo for
policymakers who want to survive, literally, not ¡ust politically. It was
no accident that Aron referred to the heroism of letting-go (I'héroisme
de l'abandon) being required to pursue decolonization, particularly of
Algeria, in the context of French political culture of this period.28
The strong mainstream consensus in France 
- 
from the Left to the
Right, with the exception of the Communist Party and some left-wing
Catholics, but only after 1956 
- 
concerning the need to honour the
constitutional norm that France extended from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset
did not result, however, in a strong French government during this cru-
cial period. The emphasis on a unitary republic can therefore be seen
as reflecting a long-term cultural preference for centralization, but also
a form of over-compensation for the very real fragmentation in French
politics. Not only was the French party system very fragmented, but
basic constitutional norms of the Fourth Republic 
- 
dating fuom 1.946 
-
were not supported by two of its strongest parties: the Communists
and the Gaullists. The idea of the 'weakness of the [political] institu-
tions', in fact, gained increasing popularity as an explanation for the
ills of France. This made the governing elite all the more anxious to
rally support around the flag by appealing to the ideal of republican
imperialism.2e
Regardless of or despite calculations, the degree to which political
leaders or intellectuals were also permeable to the power of these cul-
tural norms that were closely linked with the social construction of
national identity should not be underestimated. The very influential
editor of NoavelObservateur, lean Daniel, states that in the mid-1950s all
the political elite, but also all the intellectual elite, saw Algeria as 'irre-
versibly French' regardless of the criticism they might have of its mis-
management. And he went further by saying that 'it is difficult to make
people understand' nowadays that'French Algeria' was then'something
so natural' that it was 'audacious to discuss and blasphemous to ques-
tion'.3o This was demonstrated through the massive parliamentary
majority that voted for the grantfng of special powers to the govern-
ment in 1956 to deal with the Algerian insurgency.3l These are clear
markers of strong mainstream cultural norms 
- 
requiring unquestioning
acceptance of certain assumptions, certain taboos that are then difficult
1,34 Brwto Cardoso Reìs
to understand for people in other contexts. This is also evidence of how
they could become maior obstacles to decolonization. The Algerian
War (1954-62) can be seen as a paradigmatic example of how 'war is an
extension of culture, as well as politics'.3z
The relation with the rest of overseas France was not as legally pre-
determined as with the so-called Algerian departments. But the great
ideals of the French republic were still seen as the best chance for the
liberation of the native population by better integration into a great
fraternal French Union, the core myth that made this republican empire
fit with French self-perception. These more idealistic assumptions
were reinforced by the strong conviction that the greatness of France
depended on Greater France overseas, and so did its security. The very
recent trauma of the German occupation during the Second World War,
and the role of the colonies and the colonial Army in reviving French
fortunes by rallying to the Free France of de Gaulle, only reinforced this.
In a speech ln 1944 in Brazzaville, de Gaulle had promised progress for
the colonies. But after 1945, he emphasized, and his followers devoutly
echoed, the notion that for France 'to lose the French Union would be
a downgrade in status that might cost us our independence. To keep it,
to give it vigour, is to remain great and consequently free'.¡¡ It took the
cumulative erosion caused by the successive wars of decolonization in
Indochina (1946-54) and Algeria (1,954-62), and growing internatlonal
isolation, to eventually force de Gaulle and a maiority of Frenchmen to
do some painful rethinking.
In the meantime, however, decolonization had been made more dif-
ficult because the war in Algeria gave an increasingly strong role to the
French Army, which traditionally saw itself as the guardÍan of empire.
This allowed the military to add its own veto to that of multiple politi.
cal actors, blocking any maior change and creating even more of an
impasse.3a The return of de Gaulle to power was the ultimate proof of
this, being the direct result of the military pronunciamento of 1.3 May
1958 
- 
even if the end result would be the exact opposite of the wishes
of those colonial officers who promoted it. The French Empire 'offered
a field of glory for the fighting services [...] it is this part played by the
French army in Afrlca [..,] which explains the attitude of certain "colo-
nels" of the present time/ and their implacable hostility to the prospect
of "decolonization"',3s For colonial officers, the survival of their corpo-
rate identitf the meaning of their life of service overseas, was at stake.
One of the most influential of these colonial officers, Colonel
Trinquier, chose for his rnemoirs the title Le Temps Perdu 
- 
his life
defending Greater France had been wasted. He had, after all, been a
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major actor in developing French counter-insurgency in Indochina and
Algeria, had advocated the use of brutal interrogation 
- 
torture 
- todefeat the National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale,
FLN) network in Algeria. He had been a maior player behind the May
1'958 pronunciamento that led to the fall of the Fourth Republic, a fact
duly acknowledged by Trinquier,s appointment as the third-highest
ranking figure in the Algiers committee of public safety. This provides
context for a revealin g tête-à-tête with de Gaulle. The new French presi-
dent made a point of visiting the remote sector to which rrinquier had
been transferred after all officers had been ordered out of politics. De
Gaulle told rrinquier: 'You people must not press me!,Trinquier replied
that, surely, he 'did not reproach the army for its passion for Algeria,.
De Gaulle curtly replied: 'Every passion has its limits!,36 This is reveal-
ing of the kind of high emotional attachment to goals that are highly
valued culturally.
Reason and therefore decolonization had to prevail over strongly
entrenched cultural preferences. To do this de Gaulle would need to
legitimise his Fifth Republic centred on a 'clausewitzian presidency,
with total control over all key strategic decisions.3T
General de Gaulle may have been emotionally torn between the pre_
sent ratlonal need to turn the page on the glorious past of the French
Empire, but he was also uniquely equipped with charisma and cultural
sensibility to make this as acceptable as possible in the context of
French political culture. what de Gaulle believed was required was a
reconstruction of French national identity and a reframing of its links
with former colonies, but also the reconstruction of the French Republic
so as to make the state stronget to overcome the difficult problems not
only of imposing decolonization but also of rebuilding post-colonial
French status in the woild.
De Gaulle decided upon the strategic necessity of abandoning Algeria,
not because of a sudden conversion to the goodness of emancipation,
or the equality of the colonized. In fact he described the task of decolo-
nization as a 'cruel trial', but it was necessary to ,disengage from the
costs, no longer countered by benefits, of our empire'.38 There was also
a wlder global normative calculation in his choice, as he put it to a close
confidant, to recover French prestige 'we cannot have the entire world
against us'.3e This only shows that de Gaulle,s cultural preferences and
assumptions, and his difficulty in overcoming them, were not funda_
mentally different from those of his adversaries.
President de Gaulle also moved towards decolonization, however,
because in his understanding of French identity it would be absurd to
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try to retain sovereignty by integrating fully all Algerians as citizens of
France, as required after the collapse of the international legitimacy of
the standard of civilization that had solved the contradictions of having
a republican empire. It would simply be unimaginable, in his strongly
culturalist, if not racialist, vision of France, to eventually have an 'Arab
in the Elysée' as French president.aO
Another key concern for de Gaulle was to avoid any impression of a
new traumatic and humiliating defeat, to be able to say: 'there will be
no Dien Bien Phu. The army will withdraw victorious' from Algeria.al As
for decolonization more broadly, he explicitly stated that it was essen-
tial to grant independence voluntarily not 'by a defeat inflicted by the
colonized on the colonizers'.42 The success of the Challe Plan In Algeria
and the defeat of an uprising in the Cameroons provided him with
that in 1959-60. De Gaulle also needed a political victory. He turned
the October 1958 referendum into a choice for him, for the new con-
stitution of the Fifth Republic, but also in the overseas territories into
a choice for France. Vote'Yes for France'as his propaganda posters put
it. His victory meant he could present his decision for decolonization
in 1959-60 as not being imposed by Algerians or other Africans, but as
wisely given by France, despite the continued political allegiance of the
population of their overseas territories. Even if this has a strong dimen-
sion of myth 
- 
because it is unclear how representative the vote was or
how long this would last 
- 
it still performed an important symbolic role.
It was indeed especially important for the acceptance of decolonization
in terms of French political culture for de Gaulle to be able to plausibly
argue, as he did, that France was 'leading the people of overseas France
into self-rule and at the same time building between them and us close
co-operation'. The French manifest destiny as a universal civilizing
power would not be lost, because 'the progress, the friendship, the
attitudes, the interests' that had resulted from French 'vocation of influ-
ence and expansion would make them privileged partners' of France.a3
Once the decision by de Gaulle was made to accelerate towards decolo-
nization it was naturally carried out according to a Cartesian logic. If a few
wanted to go 
- 
namely in 1959, the leaders of Madagascar and Mali 
- 
then
all had to go. This imposition of a French approach is best illustrated by
the fact that the presidents of the lvory Coast and Gabon had to be more
or less pressed into independence, even if most pro-French Afiican leaders
were showing a growing desire for a more prestigious international status.
The norm of union with France without independence could be logically
replaced by a new norm of close co-operation with independence for all
major French territories in the African continent.aa
I
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This turned out to be not iust culturally adequate, but also really sig-
nificant with the emergence of a French sphere of influence in most of
its African colonies, with formal summits of frøncophoníe and frequent
state visits being complemented by close support for African ruling
elites by French intelligence and military force if need be.as For all
the weaknesses and normative criticism that can be made of this neo-
colonial French way of decolonization, for all the bad press it has had in
English, the fact remains that France was the most successful case of the
three in obtaining, at least for a while, the stated aims of this Gaulliste
decolonization. Not bad for a Gaullist France so often accused of delu-
sions of grandeur, and powerful evidence that to see culture and power,
myth and reality as fundamentally opposite is simply wrong.a6
The decolonization of French sub-Saharan Africa was made to con-
form to French political culture. A French preference for Cartesian uni-
formity led to a rapid uniform granting of independence to all the major
French colonies in continental Africa.
This created some difficulties for Britain, which suddenly could no
longer keep on planning for a more conditioned and slower decolo-
nization in certain areas of central and eastern Africa and claim that
it was the great liberal colonial power. Not when even France, soon to
be followed by Belgium 
- 
that had long provided a useful contrast for
British diplomats 
- 
was granting it all and granting it fast. Whitehall
still claimed it was not going to be pressed; in fact it suddenly had to
accelerate its pace if it wanted to keep its myth of decolonization alive
and avoid alienating African elites. Portugal would, of course, be in even
greater difficulties.
Most crucial of all, this Cartesian shaping of French decolonization,
granting independence to all its African colonies in 1960, not only
made the 'year of Africa' at the UN possible; it was also vital in creating
the very concept of decolonization that only then entered common
usage.
Portugal: from Republican imperialism to
fraternal liberation
Portuguese imperial policy under Salazar, who ruled the country from
1928-68, has been portrayed as paradigmatic of lack of realism, of a
fundamental disconnect between foreign policy and international sys-
temic imperatives of realpolitik. It would therefore seem to provide the
ideal case to show the potentially overwhelming influence of cultural
political constructs in determining foreign policy against any rational
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calculation of interest. And yet, as we just argued, a linear concept of
the decolonization of Africa was far frorn clear until at least 1959-60.
Still, when in 1963 George Ball, a US undersecretary of state, was sent
by President Kennedy as a pet'sonal envoy to try to convince Salazar
to be more realistic and adopt a policy of gradual decolonization, he
reported to Washington that he had failed, because Portugal was ruled
not by one dictator but 'by a triumvirate consisting of Vasco da Gama,
Prince Henry the Navigator and Salazar',47 Ball was right in pointing
to the importance of a deep-rooted colonial nationalism in Portuguese
political culture. But this was neither exclusive of the New State regime,
nor did it mean Salazar was totally lost in the past and unaware of the
dynamics of the modern wotld or the potential costs of his choice.
There is evidence that this manifest colonial mission was deeply
rooted and widespread ln Portuguese political culture for most of the
20th century. It was not simply something forced by Salazar's authori-
tarian regime. Salazar claimed that 'this union [with the overseas territo-
ries] gives us an indispensable optirnism and sense of greatness';a8 while
General Norton de Matos 
- 
supported by all the groups opposing Salazar
as their presidential candidate in 1949 
- 
in his electoral manifesto went
as far as to state:'the Nation is one [...] the development of the colo-
nies must therefore be properly called national development, because
there is no such thing as colonial policy, there is only national policy'.ae
Almeida Santos, an influential figures of a new generation of political
leaders opposing the New State regime, who would himself eventually
play an important role in the decolonization process/ in 1974-75 as
the last (overseas) territories co-ordination ministeq did not hesitate to
confess his conviction that in 1,961, when Salazar reacted by sending
massive numbers of troops against the first maior nationalist uprising in
Angola, 'he [Salazar] had with him the maiority of the people, including
some of his most prestigious political adversaries'.s0
This very strong and widespread political prejudice in favour of a
Greater Portugal was formalized into Portuguese constitutional law by
the colonial Act of 1930, which stated in Article z thati'it is part of the
organic essence of the Poltuguese nation to pursue the historic mission
of holding and colonizing overseas territories, and civilizing their native
populations'; and that all territories under Portuguese sovereignty were
part of a unitary Portuguese Republic.sl In 1951 the empire was replaced
by the even more integrationist concept of Overseas Provinces, formally
part of a single multi-racial and pluri-continental single Portuguese state.
The Portuguese military was particularly immersed in this political
culture that saw the empire as part of a glorious legacy going back to the
1
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golden age of the discoveries. Officers 
- 
who would later became
critical of colonialism and who played crucial roles in the post-1974
decolonization process 
- 
recognize that initially they.too saw 'their'
counter-insurgency as the continuation of the epic of the africønistas,
officers who became part of ìhe national pantheon of heroes because
of their role in occupying Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, This was
even more the case, of course, among the militant nationalists who vol-
unteered to fight in Africa. For them, Portuguese Africa and the whole
empire overseas was'a myth, a principle, and as with all myths [.,.]
untouchable, indisputable'.sz Any wavering in this respect, moreover/
by an authoritarian regime that had as its official motto 'Everything for
the Nation' would have potentially disastrous political costs, as would
be shown by the reactions to the feeble attempts of Salazar's successor
Marcelo Caetano to change something in the Portuguese politico-
administrative framework ovetseas.s3
Does this mean that Portugal was so blinded by cultural prejudices
that it refused to see decolonization coming its way? In part the answer
is yes. And yet Salazar always prided himself of being a realpolitiker, as
is made clear by his reaction to American attempts to make him see the
world as Washington did. After an attempt at regime change resulted in
a failed pronuncìamento by senior military commanders in April 1961,
Salazar complained to a close confidant that he did not mind so much
the politically logical attempt 'to get rid of me', what 'irritates me is the
fact they are treating me as a fool', that is as someone whose political
differences with Washington could only be the result of his failure to
understand global politics.
Salazar could credibly claim that he did not ignore the strong global
trend towards decolonization, or the risks in resisting it, but he still
wanted to fight it for reasons that had to do with culturally shaped
preferences as well as a certain perception of realpolitik. Indeed, in
1957 
- 
anticipating Macmillan's famous speech, and probably reflect-
ing knowledge of Eisenhower's second inaugural address, and most
certainly his analysis of the implications of the Suez Franco-British
debacle 
- 
Salazar publicly stated that 'one of the winds that dominate
the world is anti-colonialism'.sa What he probably did not expect was
for the wind to gain so much speed so quickly. Portugal was partly
deceived by the confidential information it was receiving fiom quadri-
partite consultations with Belgium, Britain, and France, during which it
was far from clear that speedy decolonization of all of Africa was on the
cards until as late as 1959, namely for the territories bordering Angola
and Mozambique. To a certain degree, Salazar was therefore most likely
-Y-
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somewhat surprised by the sudden and generalized nature of French
and then Belgian decolonization in Africa.
Salazar's conclusions even then remained different from the ones
extracted by Macmillan or even de Gaulle. He would not seek to appease
this new political wave by giving in to it. The Portuguese dictator
believed he had to resist this wind of change at all costs because it was
contrary to his notion of Portuguese identity as a great country whose
manifest destiny it was to be present overseas.
Salazar knew this was a risky option for a relatively weak country
like Portugal. In a private conversation with one of his confidants, who
questioned him about the state of national defence, Salazar simply
replied: 'in the case of Portugal [...] it is a permanent miracle!' But in his
view, the very existence of Portugal as a truly independent state of some
importance in the world was at stake. Salazar's vision of international
politics took into account power politics but also what can perhaps best
be characterized as a notion of balance of wills, where strong convic-
tions and firmness in defence of a certain vision had a major role as a
power multiplier. Salazar argued in November 1951 that while no state
was ever 'entirely free', it was possible to resist foreign pressure if: first,
there was a clear political vision; second, the latter was pursued relent-
lessly by a strong government with solid public support.ss
Two major questions remain. Would a different regime have acted dif-
ferently and decolonized earlier? What happened to these cultural pref-
erences that led to a collapse of the commitment to a Greater Portugal
alongside the collapse of the New State in 1974?
The first question is impossible to answer definitively, inevitably requir-
ing speculative counter-factuals. But this comparative approach allows us
to point out that France had a democratic regime but with a very simi-
lar political culture to that of Portugal in terms of the importance of a
republican empire and of a profoundly colonial nationalism. Therefore
a democratic regime in Portugal in the 1950s or 1960s would plausibly
not have been less nationalistic than that of France. On the other hand,
it is probably true that a democratic regime in Portugal would have
been more open to outside pressure than the one led by Salazar 
- 
as the
French Fourth Republic indeed was, but then this was a major factor in
its downfall in 1958. It is worth bearing in mind that the only realistic
option of a fall of the New State during this period was the failed military
pronunciamento of April 1961, which had been preceded by informal
conversations between the military leaders involved in the attempt
to force some kind of regime change and the US Embassy. During the
talks, these possible future leaders of Portugal asked for, and apparently
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obtained, informal US support for a prolonged period of transition end-
ing in self-determination, but not necessarily independence. The most
that can be said is that it would be mistaken to take as.a given that, in
light of Portuguese political cglture, decolonization could have been pur-
sued with ease by a different of Portuguese regime.
What had changed then, in the run-up to 1974? There were short-
term triggers, like the global crisis of 1973, which hit Portugal par-
ticularly hard; and the replacement of Salazar by a less charismatic
successor, Marcelo Caetano. Caetano, even if he had more doubts than
Salazar about the possibility of full integration and of successful resist-
ance, still felt very much bound by the taboo that the fatherland could
not be questioned. Therefore, in his eyes, any changes in Portuguese
Afiica would have had to be contained within a vague 'progressive
autonomy'. Perhaps he would have liked to go further, perhaps not.
He avowedly 'belonged to a generation to whom overseas [territories]
had become the focus of national hopes [...] the Republic was from
the beginning a dogmatic defender of the overseas heritage'. For him
independence, certainly in the short to medium term, was simply
unthinkable: 'Portuguese public opinion would be nauseated to see the
butchers [i.e. the nationalist insurgents] rewarded'. He went on to ask
rhetorically: '[H]ow could we give up [to] a few dozen adventurers all
these people, the work we had accomplished?'s6
The Portuguese population had also changed. Demographic growth
had led to an increasingly young population that was more and more
integrated into Western Europe because of better education, economic
migration, and the flow of migrants and tourists from Europe every
summer; because, among the elites, of mernbership of NATO and the
European Free Trade Association (EFIA). The urgency of a rethink evi-
dently came from the protracted and seemingly endless nature of the war
to which all this younger population were exposed as conscripts. This was
even more the case for the reduced cadre of professional officers, whose
colonial patriotism was brutally tried by the experience of often three
two-year tours of combat duty in Africa in the span of a decade. This was
made more urgent given the possibility of serious military problems from
1973 onwards, at least in Guinea, where a number of military outposts on
the borders were on the verge of becoming a Portuguese Dien Bien Phu,
Last but not least, the close identification of the war and the empire with
an increasingly discredited authoritarian regime ended up increasingly
discrediting by association the tradition of nationalist imperialism.
What is amazing, in light of this context, is not that the will to fight
against decolonization of many military officers collapsed in April 197 4.
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Rather, it is the fact that strong cultural attachments to this idea of a
Greater Portugal kept the struggle going for more than a decade, and
that, indeed, some of the leading officers in the April 797 4 coup, not
least its first formal leader General Spínola, still tried to retain some
kind of close federal connection with at least Angola, In the book that
helped ignite the revolution and promote Spínola to head the new tran-
sitional junta 
- 
Portugal e o Fufliro (Portugal and the Future) 
- 
he argued
for a Lusitanian federation. More importantly, he argued this should be
achieved by'gradual evolution' to permit the 'development in political
consciousness of all populations' 
- 
that is, of whatever colour 
- 
as a
way towards 'self-determination' that would preserve 'harmonious and
permanent ünity'.sz The points of contact with other myths of decolo-
nization are obvious.
Major crises like a war or a revolution 
- 
of in the case of Portugal,
both 
- 
are typically necessary to allow a major revision of deeply rooted
cultural norms and identity. They allowed the unthinkable decoloniza-
tion to become conceivable. Yet decolonization still required some kind
of cultural myth-rnaking to make it more acceptable. As one of the most
politically committed officers in the MFA, MaJor Melo Antunes later
acknowledged, the suppression of a reference to independence or even
self-determination in the coup manifesto 
- 
that he wrote for the most
part 
- 
was due to the fact that 'despite all the cares in terms of seman-
tics' this was still 'an extremely delicate subject'.s8
Even in defeat, when forced by circumstances on the ground in Africa
and politically in Portugal to move faster towards independence than
he had hoped, Spínola still tried to save his honour and the myth of
decolonization he was attempting to create by affirming that this was
just another way to achieve what had always been his ultimate vision.
This was why Spínola claimed the Law of July 1974 corresponded to
his aims of self-determination going back to his time as governor of
Portuguese Guinea. Another way of doing this was to identify the for-
mer Portuguese regime as their common oppressor, and point to inde-
pendence as shared liberation. The Portuguese military conspirators,
the MFA, who openly took over from Spínola after September 1974,
quickly came to frame themselves as the fourth armed liberation move-
ment, closely identifying with the nationalist anti-colonial movements
in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea, as brothers-in-arms, all victims
of the oppression, the violence, and the war imposed by the former
Portuguese regime.
National liberation in Portugal 
- 
democratization 
- 
was inueasingly
seen as logically implying decolonization/ that is national liberation for
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its African territories. This may well be largely a myth and a cover for
many military officers who wanted to stop fighting. But even if this was
the case, the question remains: Why did this myth become necessary?
Why not simply state the obvious interest in stopping the conflict?
In my view, the answer is that Portugal also required some variant of the
myth of decolonization for it to be acceptable as the appropriate and
honourable thing to do, not as simply being forced by military exhaus-
tion 
- 
and this was indeed not necessarily the case in all theatres. And
here again we are caught in the traps of political culture; if the regime,
and more broadly Portuguese nationalism, had for so long presented
the overseas territories as one Ultramar, then conversely they had to
decolonize them as one, even areas like East Timor where, initially at
least, it is unclear this was what locals wished.
Decolonization was perceived and portrayed not as a sacrifice of
a close Lusotropical connection with former colonies, but rather as
the creation of new and better bonds, of a new fiaternal community
based not only on shared language and culture, which would not be
lost, but also shared oppression and liberation. We should not dismiss
out of hand myths' power of attraction even for their own creators/ or
their real political impact. Melo Antunes was the major military figure
in the MFA articulating this programme of rapid decolonization, and
also for years after the 1974 coup an influential figure as a presidential
advisor working towards closer relations with the former Portuguese
colonies. Some of his even more revolutionary comrades went on
to sacrifice their military careers for their 
- 
more or less recent, but
sincere 
- 
radical political convictions, sometimes in exile in the
former colonies.
The Portuguese case certainly seems to show that, even in the face
of maior, international systemic pressure and international normative
ruptures/ to change cultural preferences that are deeply rooted in
domestic political traditions requires not only time and major ffises
and/or losing a war, but also some effort at reframing identity by cul-
tural myth-making.
Conclusion: myths of decolonization and their study
The main comlnon element of the myths of decolonization in these
three cases was that decolonization should not be equated with defeat,
decline, or a definitive loss of a traditional overseas connection. FÍom
this common aspect derive specific constructions of decolonization
according to different political cultures. In the case of Britain, there
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was the Whig version of the history of decolonization as a great liberal
design pragmatically administered resulting in the Commonwealth.
In the case of France, there was the ideal of a republican empire giving
way to a French Union and then Ia ftancophonie. The union of French-
speaking countries could be presented plausibly as being wisely trans-
formed by de Gaulle's Fifth Republic into a ftancophonie united by a
shared language and a shared culture, with Paris still its undisputed
centre. In the case of Portugal, the notion of a single pluri-continental
countty was replaced by the notion of a fraternal partnership based
on mutual liberation by armecl movements. This transformed the
Portuguese officers involved in the 25 April coup into liberators both
overseas and at home, using the complete change in governing elites
and the turn to the Left in Portugal to give credence to a narrative of a
common struggle against an authoritarian regime, oppressive in Europe
and in Africa, eventually leading to a new community of equals. The
Commonwealth, la ftøncophonie, and eventually the Community of
Portuguese-Speaking Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua
Portuguesa, CPLP) can be seen, in part, as a formal manifestation of this
cultural construction of decolonization.
The main argument of this text is that these three colonial pow-
ers linked their colonial empires closely to national identity. Britain,
France, and Portugal were very much proud imperial nations, at least
at the level of mainstleam views. Even if the degree of imperialist
conviction is hard to iudge exactlt few will dispute that generic anti-
colonialism 
- 
as different from specific criticisms of particular colonial
practices 
- 
was significantly very much a minority view well into the
20th century. This close association in British, French, and Portuguese
political culture between imperialism and nationalism became a maior
obstacle to decolonization. Decolonization, therefore, only became
acceptable once a new cultural construct/ a myth, was built around it.
This had to be a credible story/ but it evidently does not have to be the
whole story. It still performed the crucial task of reconciling decoloniza-
tion with a partially reconstructed national identity. Historians have for
some time been carefully deconstructing, based on archival work, these
myths of decolonization. This is a very important task, but it is insuffi-
cient: it is also necessary to take these myths seriously and analyse them
in depth. Another key point is that the very wotd 'decolonization' was
very much a cultural construction that only spread rapidly from France
from 1959 onwards. This is of course an alea of research to be pursued
further, not iust by comparing colonizing powers, but also by looking
at the mutual re-constitutions of national identities of former colonizers
!i
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and the former colonized. This can best be done through a comparative
approach, as a way of analysing cultural specificities without falling into
essentialist or organic notions of culture.
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